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Comments
Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: A Law and
Economics Rationale for Exemption
INTRODUCTION
Few sectors of the economy have been the subject of as many
policy initiatives as the health care industry. These initiatives have
been designed to make health care more available for people of all
incomes; to improve its geographic distribution; to redirect its re-
sources to unmet needs; to make its delivery more comprehensive
and economical; and to eliminate its excess capacity which resulted
from the prior initiatives. Today many of these initiatives have
been abandoned. Forty years of tinkering have left a health care
system which is more expensive, more sophisticated in technology
and more complex institutionally. It leaves us puzzled about solu-
tions. In 1988 a new initiative began. With acute care hospitals'
operating with significant excess capacity in beds and services,
nonprofit hospital mergers have been challenged as violating anti-
trust laws. This followed closely on the heels of challenging merg-
ers involving hospitals operated for profit.
2
The goals of the antitrust laws are to promote competition, eco-
nomic efficiency3 and consumer welfare by preventing or punishing
activities which tend to create monopolies. Antitrust laws do not
1. Acute care hospitals provide in-patient medical care to patients for a brief period,
generally less than 30 days.
2. Hospital Corp. of Am. v FTC, 807 F2d 1381 (7th Cir 1986). This case was the
culmination of the Federal Trade Commission's challenge of hospital acquisitions made by
the largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States. Hospital Corp. of Am., 807 F2d at
1383-84. This comment focuses on the more recent decisions regarding nonprofit hospital
mergers because such hospitals are the dominant mode of organization among acute care
hospitals and because the extension of antitrust law to such organizations opens a consider-
able number of localized hospital decisions to antitrust scrutiny.
3. Efficiency describes the relationship between aggregate benefits and aggregate
costs in the use of a particular combination of resources, such as materials, labor, equip-
ment. An efficient use of those resources should produce an aggregate benefit which cannot
be increased without increasing the resources. Alternatively, if a specific benefit is desired,
an efficient use of the resources would be one which achieves that benefit at the least cost.
A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 7-10 (Little, Brown and Co.
2d ed 1989).
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prevent all monopolies, however. Where the development of mo-
nopoly power is the result of legitimate business activity and not
the result of conspiracy among competitors, mergers which reduce
competition, or other prohibited activities, the existence of a mo-
nopoly is not a violation of the law.
This comment will examine the application of antitrust laws to
hospital mergers within the context of the overall health care pol-
icy direction of the past four decades. Some of the policy initia-
tives of the past have contributed to a hospital market with excess
capacity. The structure of the hospital market will be shown to
encourage the duplication of services which raise costs. The in-
tended results of mergers between hospitals are to reduce the ex-
cess capacity and minimize the duplication of services. Mergers
make the hospital market less competitive but more efficient.
Thus, the interests of efficiency and of health care cost contain-
ment would be better served by a statutory exemption from anti-
trust laws for hospital mergers.
BACKGROUND
Beginning in the immediate post-World War II period, the con-
struction of hospital facilities was encouraged in 1946 by the Hill-
Burton Act4 through which deficiencies in the availability of hospi-
tal beds, especially in rural areas, were to be corrected. Another
initiative to make health care, particularly acute in-patient care,
more available was the passage in 1965 of Medicare5 and Medical
Assistance.6 These reimbursement programs were to assist those
over the age of 65 and those with low incomes to obtain the health
4. Hospital Survey & Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act), 42 USC §§ 291-291o-1
(1988). Under this Act, grants and loans were made available for construction and moderni-
zation of public and nonprofit hospital facilities. Id.
5. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 USC §§ 1395-1395ccc (1988). Medicare
provides hospital benefits described as Part A and medical benefits described as Part B to
persons age 65 years and older. Part A is provided without premium payment and covers
hospital services, subject to certain deductibles and co-payments. Part B is elective and
requires the payment of a monthly premium. Part B covers physician and related services
subject to certain deductibles and co-payments. Id.
6. Grants to States for Medical Assistance iPrograms Act, 42 USC §§ 1396-1396s
(1988). Medical Assistance is a program of medical coverage for hospital and physician ser-
vices funded jointly by federal and state governments. States administer the program under
their own rules, but must comply with certain minimum federal requirements. Eligibility is
based on income and asset limitations. Generally, only persons living on incomes below the
federally defined poverty level are eligible. Often, benefits are not available unless a person
is significantly below the poverty level. Id.
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care services they needed. The National Health Service Corps7 was
created in 1976 to redistribute an urban physician surplus into ru-
ral and inner-city locations, thereby making physician services
more available in rural and inner-city locations.
After 20 years of intentionally increasing the resources invested
in health care and encouraging increased utilization, concerns were
raised about the cost of health care. Policy-makers began to search
for new programs to curb or reduce the growth rate. Out of this
search came the Comprehensive Health Planning and Public
Health Services Amendments of 1966 (hereinafter "CHP"),8 which
brought together health care providers and consumers in a volun-
tary program to rationalize the development of health care through
planning and through review of large capital expenditures.
Accompanying the CHP effort, the Regional Medical Program9
was established to encourage the development of education, re-
search, training and demonstration programs aimed at heart dis-
ease, cancer, strokes and related diseases. Also authorized during
this time were experimental health programs to encourage more
economical utilization of comprehensive health and mental health
services."0 Another part of this period of policy initiatives was Pro-
fessional Standards Review Organizations,"" which were created to
establish standards among health care providers which would as-
sure that services paid under Medicare conformed to appropriate
professional standards.
Pure voluntarism, as embodied in CHP, was short-lived as a pol-
icy to contain the growth and the cost of health care. Continued
escalation in health costs suggested that a coalition of providers
and consumers was ineffective in restraining the growth and dupli-
cation of health care services. Midway through the 1970's, Compre-
hensive Health Planning agencies, Regional Medical Programs and
7. Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976, 42 USC §§ 254d(a)-
254d(i) (1988). The National Health Service Corps allows medical students to enter into
agreements with the federal government under which the government pays the costs of a
student's medical education and the student agrees to serve for two to four years after com-
pletion of school and residency as a physician in an under-served area. Service in such
Health Professional Shortage Areas for the agreed upon time means that the physician's
medical education expenses are forgiven. Id.
8. Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services Amendments of
1966, 42 USC §§ 243, 245a, 246 (1988).
9. Heart Disease, Cancer & Stroke Amendments of 1965, 42 USC §§ 299(a)-
299(j)(1988), repealed by Health Services Amendments of 1985, Pub L No 99-117, § 12d, 99
Stat 495.
10. Social Security Amendments of 1972, 42 USC §§ 1395b-l(a)-1395b-l(b) (1988).
11. Tax Equity & Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 42 USC § 1320c-1 (1988).
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experiments in health care delivery were largely replaced by
Health Systems Agencies under the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974.12 This new policy initiative
was intended to "put teeth" into the previously voluntary program
which reviewed capital expenditures and new programs of health
care providers.
This initiative required new services and capital expenditures by
health care providers to have a Certificate of Need (hereinafter
"CON") approved by the local Health Systems Agency and by the
state's Health Planning and Development Agency. The local and
state agencies were to formulate regional and statewide compre-
hensive health plans which would serve as the basis for granting or
denying a CON.'3 When this policy initiative failed to turn around
the growth of the health care industry which had been infused
with substantial financial resources for 40 years, it was repealed.
14
After almost 50 years of health policy initiatives which first
sought to feed the health care industry and then to starve it, mar-
ket forces have been turned to as the means which will correct the
problems of growth in health care. The replacement of cost-based
reimbursement by prospective payment for hospital services to
Medicare recipients 5 has been one means of putting market forces
into play. When the return sellers can receive for a product or ser-
vice is reduced, sellers are inclined to provide less. Thus, hospitals
responded to prospective payment by attempting to reduce lengths
of stay to keep costs within the prospective payments.' 6 Under
pressure from reduced revenues, hospitals could be expected to
find ways to combine in order to reduce costs and increase reve-
nues. In 1984, hospital mergers came under the scrutiny of federal
antitrust enforcement.
17
12. National Health Planning & Resources Development Act, 42 USC §§ 300k-1-
300k-3 (1988), repealed by §701(a), Pub L 99-660, 100 Stat 3799.
13. Id.
14. Repeal of Title XV, Pub L No 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat 3799. CON legislation
still exists in many states as an artifact of the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act. Federal funding for regional Health Systems Agencies has ended.
15. Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, 42 USC § 1395ww (1988).
16. Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Trans-
formation of the Hospital Industry, 51 Law & Contemp Probs 93, 98 (Spring 1988).
17. See In re Am. Medical Int'l, Inc., 104 FTC 1 (1984). American Medical Interna-
tional (hereinafter "AMI"), a for-profit corporation, acquired French Hospital in San Luis
Obispo, California, giving AMI control over two of the three hospitals in the city. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission challenged the acquisition as violating section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Section 7 provides that a corporate merger is illegal if it lessens competition. AMI was or-
dered to divest French Hospital. Id.
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In 1988, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department initi-
ated antitrust actions to prevent mergers of nonprofit hospitals in
Roanoke, Virginia (hereinafter "Roanoke") 18 and in Rockford, Illi-
nois (hereinafter "Rockford"). 19 As the first two antitrust actions
against nonprofit hospitals, these cases received considerable at-
tention. When the two district courts arrived at different conclu-
sions as to whether such mergers violated antitrust laws 20 and both
were affirmed on appeal,21 the status of the law regarding nonprofit
hospital mergers was left unsettled.
The opinions in these cases have generated discussion about the
applicability of antitrust law to nonprofit hospital mergers. 22 Com-
mentators have recognized the unique economic characteristics of
the health care market which influence the effects of antitrust-pol-
icy and hospital mergers. While these characteristics are recog-
nized as important to antitrust analysis of hospital mergers, no
commentator has suggested that the unique characteristics of the
market for acute care hospital services justify an exemption for all
such mergers.2" However, with planning forsaken as a tool for ra-
tionalizing health care resources, mergers are the only alternative
to bankruptcies to reduce excess capacity and duplication of ser-
vices. These mergers will not occur in the magnitude required if
the Justice Department is scrutinizing mergers on a case-by-case
basis. The prospect of antitrust litigation increases the costs and
reduces the likelihood of mergers. The analysis presented below
suggests that antitrust enforcement works against the policy of
containing health care costs. The analysis also suggests that anti-
trust actions to prevent hospital mergers do not prevent a market
failure. They sacrifice efficiency for an ideal of competition, which
18. United States v Carilon Health Sys., 707 F Supp 840, 841 (WD Va 1989).
19. United States v Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F Supp 1251, 1252 (ND Ill 1989).
20. Carilon Health Sys., 707 F Supp at 849 (merger did not violate antitrust laws);
Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F Supp at 1292 (merger violated antitrust laws).
21. United States v Carilon Health Sys., 892 F2d 1042 (4th Cir 1989) (unpublished
disposition); United States v Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F2d 1278 (7th Cir 1990), cert
denied, - US -, 111 S Ct 295 (1990).
22. Comment, Roanoke or Rockford: Two Divergent Approaches to Antitrust En-
forcement for Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers, 28 Duquesne L Rev 561 (1990); Note, Non-
profit Hospital Mergers and Federal Antitrust Law: The Quest for Compatibility, 15 Del J
Corp L 539 (1990); William G. Kopit and Robert W. McCann, Toward a Definitive Anti-
trust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 13 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law 635
(1988); Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Hospital Mergers and Antitrust: An
Economic Analysis, 14 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law 383 (1989).
23. One analysis, although not focusing on economic issues, has concluded that there
are efficiencies generated by mergers which justify a limited exemption. Note, 15 Del J Corp
L at 550 (cited in note 22).
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is inconsistent with the characteristics of the market and hence are
bad economic policy and bad legal policy.
LAW AND ECONoMIcs ANALYSIS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS
The introduction of economics into legal analysis, while gaining
in adherents, is not without serious shortcomings. Substituting ec-
onomic analysis for legal analysis subverts the common law heri-
tage embodied in stare decisis24 and confirms the Critical Legal
Studies movement's instrumentalist argument that any outcome
can be supported and, therefore, the outcomes of legal analysis are
indeterminate. 25 Yet, law has an indisputable effect on economic
relationships. When law is expanded into a new set of economic
relationships, as it has been with hospital mergers, a failure to ex-
amine the economic consequences of law denies the integration of
law and economics. 6
In consideration on appeal of the lower court decision enjoining
the hospital merger in Rockford, Judge Posner of the Seventh Cir-
cuit expressed regret that so little empirical evidence is available
regarding the "actual effect of concentration on price in the hospi-
tal industry. ' 27 Nevertheless, he affirmed the district court's deci-
sion and stated that "[t]he defendants' immense shares in a rea-
sonably defined market create a presumption of illegality. ' 28 Both
the district court and the court of appeals focused on the share of
the market which the new merged entity would possess. Recogniz-
ing that the market was already concentrated,29 the district court
found unacceptable the 70% share which the merged hospital
would have.30 The court of appeals shared this concern.3 1 The
court of appeals performed some analysis of the economics by con-
sidering barriers to entry, the existence of excess capacity, the na-
ture of third party payment and their effects on price competi-
tion. 2 After acknowledging these factors, however, the court
concluded that the government's demonstration that the merger
24. The principle of stare decisis calls for courts to rely on precedent when applying
the same law to substantially the same facts.
25. Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986
Duke L J 929, 936 (1986).
26. See Ackerman, 1986 Duke L J 929 (cited in note 25).
27. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F2d at 1286.
28. Id at 1285.
29. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F Supp at 1280.
30. Id at 1281.




would create a firm with monopoly power shifted the burden to the
hospitals to show that the economics required that the merger be
allowed.33
Although the merged hospitals in Roanoke would possess a mar-
ket share of 70%3 (the same as in Rockford), the district court in
Roanoke focused its attention on issues of excess capacity and in-
creased efficiency to be achieved from a merger. Excess capacity in
the market area under consideration was about 400 beds based on
licensed capacity and 100 beds based on beds staffed and in ser-
vice.35 Savings from efficiencies of $40 million over the first five
years were recognized.36 Excess capacity in part of the area under
study for the Rockford merger was identified as 384 beds. This ex-
cess capacity in Rockford, however, was recognized by the district
court to show barriers to entry 7 rather than for consideration of
efficiencies.
If law and economics analysis were to change legal outcomes in
the application of law to the health care industry, it seems that the
Rockford and Roanoke cases would have been a good beginning.
Although the Roanoke case began to perform this analysis, Judge
Posner, in the Rockford case, ceded that ground to others. It is
uncertain how long it will take to produce the evidence which he
suggests will be necessary to change the outcomes. In the
meantime, precedent has been established which will discourage
hospital mergers. The duplication of services and the excess capac-
ity which fuel the increases in health care costs will go unchecked
by this latest federal health policy initiative.
In the absence of the studies for which Judge Posner calls, is
there a basis in economic analysis to justify antitrust enforcement
against hospital mergers or to exempt mergers from such actions?
The structure of hospitals has been described in a variety of ways:
a competitive model involving utility-maximizing behavior;38 a
physician-hospital cooperative venture;39 a physician control
model;40 two-firms-in-one (physicians and administration). 41 On
33. Id at 1285-86. The court's analysis emphasized the potential for collusion after
the merger. Id.
34. Carilon Health Sys., 707 F Supp at 848.
35. Id at 842.
36. Id at 845-46.
37. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F Supp at 1282.
38. Paul J. Feldstein, Health Care Economics 189-90 (John Wiley & Sons, 1979).
39. Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physician's
Cooperative, 631 Am Economic R 87 (1973).
40. Feldstein, Health Care Economics at 192 (cited in note 38).
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one matter, all of these analyses agree: the hospital market has pe-
culiarities which make its analysis different from that of many
other products.
The utility-maximizing or traditional economic analysis of hospi-
tals recognizes that
the hospital will still seek to maximize its profits in the short run through
its pricing strategy, but it will then attempt to invest that profit in in-
creased quantity - increased capacity, cost-saving technology, or facilities
and services that result in an increase in quantity of patients - or in pres-
tige/quality investments.42
This model recognizes that hospitals compete in terms of quality
as well as price and suggests that the market is characterized by
some degree of product differentiation. Product differentiation ex-
ists when a product earns buyer loyalty somewhat unrelated to
price.
The physician-hospital cooperative venture recognizes that a
hospital does not seek simply to maximize quantity of services
sold, but seeks to achieve a level of output sufficient to meet simul-
taneous goals of maximizing "the net income per member of the
physician staff, '43 and investment in capacity which will provide
enough excess to accommodate physicians' needs for available beds
and support services. 44 In the short-run, this model concludes that
the results will be the same as if the physicians made all of the
decisions. In the long-run, this model recognizes the interests of
administration in maintaining the hospital at a level of capacity
which allows full utilization of physicians. Thus, this model recog-
nizes internal motivation toward excess capacity.
The physician control model assumes that "the decisions under-
taken by the hospital represent the objectives of the staff physi-
cians. '"" Thus, increases in demand for hospital services would be
met by increasing hospital capacity making each physician more
productive rather than by increasing physicians and holding physi-
cian income stable.46 This model also recognizes the potential for
excess capacity.
41. Jeffrey E. Harris, The Internal Organization of Hospitals: Some Economic Im-
plications, 8 Bell J Economics 467 (1977).
42. Feldstein, Health Care Economics at 189 (cited in note 38).
43. Pauly and Redisch, 631 Am Economic R at 88 (cited in note 39).
44. Philip C. Kissam, et al, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conven-
tional Wisdom, 70 Cal L Rev 595, 609 (1982).




The two-firms-in-one model rejects the notion of physician con-
trol, whether overt or tacit. Hospital administration and medical
staff bring their different motivations into an internal non-zero
sum game with an indeterminate outcome.47 The predictable result
of this model is that the hospital is driven to increase in size.48
Throughout these models, the consumer seems to have little role
in the analysis. The role of the consumer is minimized because of
the inelasticity of demand.49 The inelasticity of demand has been
recognized as having a significant effect on the structure of the
hospital market.50 Even Judge Posner recognized in the Rockford
case that factors reducing price sensitivity of demand for hospital
services make the analysis more difficult.
5 '
For all of this analysis of the hospital and the market for its
services, commentators have not addressed what these unique eco-
nomic characteristics may imply for antitrust analysis of hospital
mergers on a system-wide basis. Perhaps because of the fact-driven
nature of legal analysis in antitrust, commentators have discussed
issues in case-by-case terms instead of systemic terms.52 The bene-
fit of a law and economics analysis should be to step back from the
trenches of antitrust litigation to determine whether the systemic
problems in the health care industry merit a systemic solution, i.e.
an exemption for mergers. An examination of the market for hospi-
tal services which addresses its unique characteristics may suggest
a systemic solution. Those who have discussed economic issues
47. Harris, 8 Bell J Economics at 477 (cited in note 41).
48. Id at 479.
49. Inelasticity of demand describes a market in which consumers will not reduce
their consumption of a product commensurate with an increase in the price. Demand for the
product is insensitive to price changes either because there are no close substitutes or be-
cause increases in price do not result in a direct decrease in consumers' income. For exam-
ple, health insurance paid for by the employer shields consumers from the effect of price
increases in health care. The consumers' costs do not change as much as the price increases.
50. Kopit and McCann, 13 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law at 642 (cited in note
22); Baker, 51 Law & Contemp Probs at 95 (cited in note 16); James F. Ponsoldt, Immunity
Doctrine, Efficiency Promotion, and the Applicability of Federal Antitrust Law to State-
Approved Hospital Acquisitions, 12 J Corp L 37, 70 (1986).
51. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F2d at 1285.
52. Hospital mergers should be examined individually for anticompetitive purpose or
effect. Kopit and McCann, 13 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law at 661 (cited in note 22).
Hospital mergers should be subject to a case-by-case analysis and permitted when benefits
are greater than costs. Blackstone and Fuhr, 14 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law at 402
(cited in note 22). Antitrust analysis of hospital mergers will be dependent on careful mar-
ket definition. Baker, 51 Law & Contemp Probs at 164 (cited in note 16). A broad exemp-




have not looked at the market as one more closely conforming to
monopolistic competition rather than to a competitive model.
Monopolistic competition theory was the result of efforts in
193311 to reconcile traditional market analysis with the reality of
elements of monopoly in many markets. In monopolistic competi-
tion, the market consists of a large enough number of firms that
each can act with independence while producing a product which is
differentiated from the similar products of other firms so that buy-
ers have a preference for one over others and a market into which
entry is unrestricted.54 However, "monopolistic competition may
be as rare as perfect competition, 5 5 and its application to a partic-
ular market may be justified if that market conforms closely to the
necessary conditions.
The market for hospital services, except for the most specialized,
is local. The number of firms (hospitals) in local markets can vary
from one hospital in a rural area to many in a metropolitan area.
Nevertheless, whether rural or urban, the hospital market is con-
centrated.5 6 In a market of two hospitals, the hospitals may oper-
ate more like an oligopoly, 57 but the differentiation of the product
still would allow analysis using the model of monopolistic competi-
tion because pricing decisions can be made independently. Thus,
the differentiation of product is a key element in determining the
applicability of monopolistic competition analysis to hospitals.
Product differentiation exists when "each product is unique and
its producer has some degree of monopoly power he can exploit.
But usually it is very little, because other producers can market a
closely related commodity. ' 58 Differentiation of product in hospital
services is the result of the intermediary role played by the physi-
cian in decisions to purchase hospital services. Physicians typically
53. Two economists, Joan Robinson in England and Edward H. Chamberlin in the
United States, simultaneously developed the theory of monopolistic competition (Robinson
called it "imperfect competition").
54. Mark Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect 399 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968).
55. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect at 402 (cited in note 54).
56. Carl J. Schramm and Steven C. Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market Concentration
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 33 Emory L J 869, 870-72 (1984). See also Kopit and
McCann, 13 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law at 640 (cited in note 22); Baker, 51 Law &
Contemp Probs at 151 (cited in note 16).
57. An oligopoly exists where a limited number of firms operate in a single market
and the actions of any one firm will affect the activities of the other firms in terms of pricing
or output. However, where the products of firms are similar but differentiated, the ability of
one firm to affect other firms is limited by buyer loyalty. See Richard H. Leftwich, The
Price System and Resource Allocation 126-30 (The Dryden Press, 1973).
58. C.E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory 287 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969).
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have privileges at one or a limited number of hospitals in one mar-
ket. Patients are admitted to the hospital by their physicians.
Thus patients, by choosing a particular physician, are limiting
their choice among hospitals to the ones at which the physician has
admitting privileges." The result is an indirect form of buyer loy-
alty based on the physician's affiliation.
The final requirement for monopolistic competition is that entry
is unrestricted. At first glance, entry into the hospital market
would seem to be restricted by the amount of capital investment
required. However, from an economic perspective, entry is re-
stricted when a new entrant into the market must bear higher
long-run costs of production than firms already in the market.60
Thus, capital requirements and licensing requirements would im-
pose no additional burden on the new entrant than they did on
existing hospitals."1 CON requirements create an artificial barrier
to entry, because they impose costs of waiting and the actual costs
of preparing documentation for the CON review process. The
Court of Appeals in the Rockford case found that CON require-
ments were a barrier to entry. 2 Commentators have described
CON requirements as entry barriers while recognizing that the re-
peal of the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act and of many state CON laws reduces this barrier.6 It has been
suggested that in an industry where supply exceeds demand, as in
the hospital market, entry barriers cannot exist because new entry
into the market is irrational. 4 The latter analysis in combination
with the waning strength of CON requirements leads to the con-
clusion that barriers to entry are not a significant problem for the
hospital market. Therefore, the final condition for monopolistic
competition is met.
Since hospitals are subject to analysis using the model of monop-
olistic competition, the question for analysis becomes: will mergers
of hospitals meet or violate the policy of antitrust? If they violate
the policy of antitrust, then the latest federal initiative is sound
59. "Patients often have little knowledge about their illnesses and how to treat them.
Doctors act as agents for patients, in many cases deciding on the amount of care and the
hospital at which it will be provided, and often simultaneously supplying that care." Baker,
51 Law & Contemp Probs at 95 (cited in note 16).
60. Schramm and Renn, 33 Emory L J at 880 (cited in note 56).
61. Id.
62. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F2d at 1285.
63. Blackstone and Fubr, 14 J of Health Politics, Policy and Law at 400 (cited in
note 22); Baker, 51 Law & Contemp Probs at 153-54 (cited in note 16).
64. Schramm and Renn, 33 Emory L J at 881 (cited in note 56).
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policy. If mergers actually serve the policy of antitrust, then the
actions of the Justice Department are at cross-purposes with the
national interest of containing health care costs. The answer to
this question will require: (1) economic analysis of mergers, and (2)
examination of antitrust policy, including the efficiencies and fail-
ing firm defenses.
The market for an individual hospital under monopolistic com-





P1 : Profit-maximizing price
P2 : Price at efficient production
C1 : Cost of output at profit-maximization
C2 Cost of output at efficient production
Q1 : Quantity produced at profit-maximization






The result of product differentiation is that the demand for the
hospital's services is less sensitive to changes in price. Therefore,
the demand curve (D) is steep. A large increase in price will result
in a smaller reduction in sales. The hospital's revenue from each
additional unit of service produced, the marginal revenue (MR),
lies below the demand curve and is steeper than the demand curve
because an increase in output would force the hospital to sell all of
its output at a lower price, thereby reducing total revenues by
more than just the revenue lost on the additional units. The aver-
age total cost curve (AC) and the marginal cost curves (MC) con-
form to the standard for any normal firm. The hospital's profit-
maximizing output is where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
Below this point, the production of an additional unit generates
more revenue than it costs and output would be increased. Above
this point, the production of an additional unit costs more than it
generates in revenue and output would be decreased.
The hospital will produce Q1 of services at an average cost of C,
or a total cost of the area bounded by OC 1AQ1. If the hospital was
free to set its price, it would sell at P1 for a total revenue of the
area bounded by OP 1BQ 1. However, the effect of third party reim-
bursement programs, such as Medicare's prospective payment and
Blue Cross' cost-based reimbursement, limits the ability of hospi-
tals to set prices which will maximize profits. Few patients pay full
charges. Thus, the hospital receives less revenue than the full mo-
nopoly profits shown in the diagram, but more revenue than its
costs.
Another result of monopolistic competition is short-run excess
capacity. Each firm can gain from limiting its product to a quan-
tity below what would be produced if the firm operated at its most
efficient level of output. The most efficient use of the hospital
would occur where marginal cost (MC) equals average cost (AC).
This is the most efficient or optimum production under a purely
competitive model because at a lower output, the cost of producing
the next unit is less and at an output above the point of equality,
the cost of producing the next unit is higher. However, for the firm
in monopolistic competition, the quantity produced at this scale of
operation, Q2, could only be sold at a lower price, P 2, and the profit
would be reduced. Hence, there is no incentive to operate at full
capacity.65
65. The implication of monopolistic competition is excess capacity which is the out-
come of too many firms compared to the number that would exist in such a market under
1991
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In such a market, greater efficiency could be achieved by al-
lowing firms to merge. Two firms of the size shown in the diagram
above would be able to achieve some cost reduction by merging.
The resulting firm would still have excess capacity because of the
nature of the market, but it would operate at lower costs because
redundant services could be eliminated profitably. While the sav-
ings might not be passed on to consumers by lower prices, it would
place less demand on resources for investment in what had been
redundant services. If price did not decrease commensurately with
costs, the increased revenues could be reinvested in needed ser-
vices, such as health care for the indigent, or taxed away if the
hospital became too profitable.
Monopolistic competition as applied to hospitals correctly
predicts the current nature of the market. The hospital market to-
day has excess capacity. Hospitals are encouraged by the market to
duplicate the services of their competitors even though the services
are underutilized. 6 The extent to which there are unexploited
economies of scale is uncertain. Although it appears that the ex-
tent of overall economies of scale are small, there may be econo-
mies to be achieved in the operation of specialized services.6 7 It is
such specialized services which often are duplicated at considera-
ble cost. Thus, the outcome of hospital mergers should be the re-
duction of excess capacity and reduction of cost or, in other words,
greater efficiency in the market for hospital services.6
The goals of antitrust are to promote competition, economic effi-
ciency and consumer welfare. Judge Posner, in his opinion in the
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Rockford case, discussed only the effect of the merger on competi-
tion.70 Similarly, the district court found it necessary to set aside
arguments of greater efficiency because the antitrust laws seek to
protect competition." Perhaps the failure to address efficiency is
rooted in the traditional equating of competition with efficiency.
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However, this does not help resolve a situation where increased
competition decreases efficiency. In such a situation, it would seem
that efficiency in terms of better allocation of scarce resources
should have priority over increased competition.
Such a priority of efficiency over competition is evidenced in an-
titrust policy already. An efficiencies defense is allowed against an-
titrust enforcement. The Federal Trade Commission has recog-
nized that some mergers have the effect of enhancing efficiencies.
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However, courts have not favored defenses of increased efficiency
projected to result from a merger.7' The efficiencies defense is
strictly construed and, thus, rarely allowed.7 5
If efficiency is a goal of antitrust policy and reduced cost is a
goal of health policy, when hospital mergers make the industry
more efficient, then grounds exist for granting hospital mergers an
exemption from antitrust actions. The focus of the Justice Depart-
ment and the courts on a case-by-case analysis of mergers and any
efficiencies defense raises the cost of potential mergers and makes
them less likely. The complexity of antitrust litigation has en-
couraged the courts to establish per se rules of illegality for certain
acts which violate the antitrust laws. Some courts have discussed
the possibility of a rule of per se legality in predatory pricing cases
when prices exceed average total cost.76 When the structure of a
market is such that mergers result in efficiencies, there should be
room for a per se rule of legality to encourage such mergers and
eliminate the excess capacity.
Another defense available to parties involved in a merger which
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is challenged under the antitrust laws is the failing firm defense.
This has been described as "a long-established but ambiguous doc-
trine which protects certain mergers when one of the merging firms
is 'failing.' -7
The failing firm defense is strictly construed to minimize the anticompeti-
tive danger: the firm must be on the verge of insolvency, the acquiring com-
pany must be the least anticompetitive purchaser available, and the ac-
quired firm must have made unsuccessful efforts to seek alternative buyers
to preserve its assets in the marketplace while reducing the danger to
competition.7
8
Although hospitals are failing at an increasing rate,79 the nature
of third party reimbursement is such that a struggling hospital can
survive for many years. Although such a defense might be available
to merging hospitals, there is good cause to question whether effi-
ciency is best served by waiting until one of the hospitals is near
bankruptcy before allowing a merger.
CONCLUSION
After adopting policies which substantially shaped the current
hospital market, the federal government tried and abandoned a va-
riety of programs to rationalize the resources being invested in that
market. After this failure to contain the costs of health care, the
self-regulating function of market forces is being called on to
achieve the results which planning and regulation apparently could
not. However, the reliance on market forces seems to be based
upon a misconception of the market.
Hospitals operate in a market of monopolistic competition which
is inherently less efficient than more competitive markets. Per-
versely, in such a market, efforts to increase competition by
preventing the merger and consequent reduction of firms has the
effect of encouraging an inefficient market, including investment in
duplicative services to preserve market position. Thus, the applica-
tion of antitrust laws to hospital mergers, whether between for-
profit hospitals or nonprofit hospitals, is in conflict with the goals
of improved efficiency and reduced health costs.
The prospect that most hospital mergers will be subject to anti-
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trust review and litigation discourages the very activity which
would make the hospital market more efficient. Antitrust review
adds substantially to the transaction costs for such mergers. In-
stead, the policy of the Justice Department and the courts should
be to recognize the unique nature of the hospital market and to
permit all hospital mergers under a general exemption as per se
legal. The only alternative to containing the costs in health care
would be a return to the more intensive regulation and planning
activities which recent administrations have spurned. If the policy
is in fact to allow market forces to work, then mergers should be
allowed because they are the result of the market at work.
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